The Myth of Postmodernism

I glanced an old book (from my first year back in Regina) which peaked my interest called "Thou Art That" by Joseph Campbell. After finishing the terrible Robin Hood movie and loving it, I decided to re-read a bit of it and was instantly blown away.
Campbell states that mythologies serve to reconcile "consciousness to the preconditions of its own existence -- that is, of aligning waking consciousness to the mysterium tremendum of this universe, as it is" (2). The first thing that got me interested was this simple idea of "as it is" (the universe). Regarding my post on taking things serious, I think most of us (if not all) take the question 'what is the universe really?' quite serious; even if we do not want to take it serious, this in itself is an answer. I also really like that Campbell uses the term 'mysterium tremendum' as a noun for the universe. The biggest and largest mystery of all is reality itself, the way we feel a need to participate or not participate in it, in various ways, define it and so forth.
Campbell continues to describe that the foundation of reality is that we live in a universe of "life eating life" (3). The moment of myth occurred in human history when "consciousness refused to accept this interpretation and there arose a system of mythologies concerned with helping people to remove themselves, to place themselves at a distance from this conception of basic experience" (3). Whether we believe that Campbell has the correct starting point here or not is unimportant, his approach to explain the process of reacting to the 'mysterium tremendum' is far more interesting. I know that many Christians would suggest that, although this 'life eating life' is the case as we encounter it today, the pre-sin reality was a kind of reality very different from this. In fact, many mythologies tell of this kind of lost golden age or age of innocence. Yet focusing upon this process of engaging, reacting and taking myths seriously is more interesting to me.
So what exactly do myths do? According to Campbell, they do four things: 1) "the first function of mythology is to arouse in the mind a sense of awe before this situation through one of three ways of participating in it: by moving out, moving in, or effecting a correction. This I would regard as the essential religious function of mythology -- that is, the mystical function, which represents the discovery and recognition of the dimension of the mystery of being" (3). I take him to mean 'moving out, moving in or effecting a correction' as the process of taking serious a myth. To be less controversial, let us take the simple myth of war: life is war. We can 'move in' to this myth by taking it as serious as we can: by stating it is a fact. We can 'move out' by taking it as serious by rejecting it as fact. Finally (although I do not think these three options are exhaustive), we take effect a correction and make an addition: we can add to the previous myth and say life is war and love.
I can see why Campbell would then suggest, as he does, that this is seen most clearly in religions. What he fails to say (or admit), which I would also argue, is that although religion is the clearest example of this, nothing else falls short of doing the same thing. Science is a similar myth, with stories and precepts that are worked upon and 'refined'. We like to think there is something more 'objective' about Science, especially in comparison with religion, but really all we find is that Science simply wants to be taken more serious (or wants to be taken serious in a special sense of serious, like a capitol 'S' serious).
I think this is what was always driving Jon to state that Science still functions on a faith. But to state that would be the same to state that Religion functions on reason. To state it is all faith-based is to have the myth-system of religion to be the foundation whereas to state it is all reason-based is to have the myth-stem of science to be the foundation. When we look closer we find that both of us are merely trying to fully account for what the other is doing, using our frame work as the foundation for the other. Who cares why we wanted it that way, but we certainly did. Earlier in this work Campbell states something very interesting on this topic, he suggests that "half the people in the world think that the metaphors of their religious traditions, ... are facts. And the other half contends that they are not facts at all. As a result we have people who consider themselves believers because they accept metaphors as facts, and we have others who classify themselves as atheists because they think religious metaphors are lies" (2).
I think at the heart of our previous debates, Jon, was this attempt to show the validity of our worldview over the others. You can see it in debates on reason, evidence, truth, morality and so forth. But this is only addressing the first of four things that myths do.
The second "function of a traditional mythology is interpretive, to present a consistent image of the order of the cosmos" (3). Again, we can expand Campbell here bring into question the idea of order itself. To take serious the question of order regarding the mysterium tremendum is to conjure up a Kosmos for our Cosmos (the original meaning of the Greek work Kosmos, was an idea of order before it became our makeshift term for the celestial heavens). So we engage with myth all around us based on this idea we modify regarding order and kosmos. We can reject order altogether, we can reaffirm it, or we can effect a correction (just as Campbell's three options already suggest for myth in general).
The third "function of a traditional mythology is to validate and support a specific moral order, the order of the society out of which that mythology arose" (5). Suddenly the curtain can go up on democracy and American world domination; it is merely revealed to be a larger myth of order in political terms. It seems that Chomsky was correct, but more than he even realized it; for all his critiques of Americanism in the globe are also revealed to be myths, rival myths. Even those newish philosophers who like to jive against the idea of morality (Existentialism, Nihilism and Anarchism) are still performing this third function of myth; by stating there is no moral order, one is still defining a moral order in the lacking. This is one thing Heidegger has really shown me.
The fourth "function of traditional mythology is to carry the individual through the various stages and crises of life -- that is, to help persons grasp the unfolding of life with integrity" (5). I think this is occurs most frequently when we do comparative analysis. In comedy movies a la Woody Allen, we hear people say things like 'tell me one thing your analyst cured your of' and frequently we forsake myths because they are unable to 'answer' our questions. We like to think that we are where we are because we are the most correct and right in our path, but usually if we are bold enough to inquire into ourselves, we find that we are where we are because our experiences have 'driven' us (like storms in the sea) towards certain waters. We have control, we are at the helm trying desperately to navigate as best we can (thus I am not denying free will here) but we cannot ignore that life's experience greatly colour our mythic-understanding of life. I have heard it frequently from the pulpit, that it is harder to follow God in 'good times' just as it is harder to be 'morally good' when you have a impoverish life.
This is a characterization of how we take Being serious. We hold it has systems or does not, we hold that you have to care about it or you do not have to, we hold that others to be this way and others should be another way or that nothing matters. I have noticed that most of these quotes say 'traditional mythology' instead of 'mythology' alone. I think, even more so since Campbell, we have lost even more 'tradition' and most of us seem to be the better for it. What is one to do with all this mythography going on around us? We wake up with preconditioned ideas, we wake up with language, we hit the road running. Even the very power of sense in our minds has been given to us by others. What is worse, is that Postmodernism has threatened us that everything is mailable, even the hardest stone pillars are susceptible to scrutiny. But that previous sentence is a myth as well isn't it, just as this entire post is too? We can read it and it can make sense to us, but that is part of the game and so are we. Do you want this myth to sound 'reasonable', do you want to put your 'faith' in a description/story like this?
This is a messy game, isn't it?


6 Comments:
Sounds like an interesting book, and I agree about the cultured nature of all our "myths" and can certainly see the four functions of mythology quite prevalently evidenced in people's worldviews. It is a messy game.
I do think you've got me right on what I wanted to say about science. But I did not want to say science was all faith based any more than I wanted anyone to say it was all reason based. Nor would I want to say that Christian belief is all faith and no reason. These are polarities that I'm not buying, and yet which I feel still runs pretty strongly through what you are setting out here. Maybe I'm wrong about that. No doubt there is a tension there, but I'm not sure that it is merely a matter of trying to heave our foundational "myth-systems" on each other. I think the goal is more holistic and unified than that, that faith and reason need not be so opposed, even if they contribute different aspects.
I'm sure you are right that in our past debates we have wanted to show the validity of our worldview over the other, but I would resonate more with the statement that I wanted to show the validity of my worldview, and show that it could not only stand the scrutiny of but be reconciled with the other.
I realize I haven't interacted with Campbell much here. I get what he's saying. One has to agree with him that we are in the business of constructing or inheriting myths in order to "take serious" what we think "it is", this "mysterium tremendum". I think we all do that, yes, and those that say they aren't are just inheriting rather than constructing. But this is a very pragmatic view. A functional view. We have myths because we want them to do something, or four things, for us. There is truth to that, but I don't know that it quite gets the heart of it. Like I said before, I don't think this is just a matter of us "taking serious" -- but of serious presenting itself to us, and us trying to grapple with it. We do so from our cultured and presupposition-prone corners, yes, but I'm not sure that makes the "seriousness" entirely a product of those things. I'm not sure you're saying that, but that is my response to the "functional" thread I sensed underlying Campbell's fine description. (having not read his book myself of course)
Are you at all concerned to take the right things seriously (however you conceive of "right")? Or are you from the beginning eliminating the notion that there are right things to take seriously? Or is it somewhere in between, in that you hope that the right things will present themselves to us as we take seriously what we take seriously?
If the first or third are your answer, I'd say you operate in some kind of faith not only in some sort of truth or rightness to existence, but in our ability to know it, or at least to have thoughts that correspond to it.
If the second is your answer, you have only evaded the question by way of a new premise, as if you can be right about there being no right thing to take seriously. I think this is a real, and perhaps necessary, alternative for you, as an atheist. I think Nietzsche may have been the highest expression of atheism in that regard. Except, as Chesterton noted, he kind of slips one past us when he calls his book "Beyond Good and Evil" rather than "More Good than Good and Evil".
I by no means want to pigeon hole you into those three alternatives, they are just the three I could think of to get at my question.
I'm a bit late to your posts here. My quick reply to your previous post is this:
Postmodernism, as a reaction to modernism, is the dissolution of absolutes.
In other news (as I have little to add to this present post), the correct word is piqued, not peaked. I'm certain it bugs you that I mention this. I'm sorry.
Leif: That's a really great concise statement. One point of clarification: Do you mean "the dissolution of absolutes" themselves or the dissolution of absolute claims?
In my experience, it is a way of looking at life which says, "There may be an 'absolute' for you, but it isn't going to be the same for others."
So it is kind of both, I guess. Most people who speak from postmodernism seem to be saying (and I've done it as well) that we cannot agree on an absolute, so the claim is dissolved because the absolute itself is either fluid or cannot be concretely defined. And from that we might as well just say that the absolute itself is being dissolved.
I hope that clarifies it a bit better.
yeah i get you. I think there is a big difference between "we might as well say the absolute is dissolved because we can't absolutely know it" and "the absolute is dissolved" (as if we absolutely know it and don't need to ask into it anymore). so your clarification clarifies, thanks.
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